# Planning for Humanitarian Assistance Operations

Sandra L. Newett

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The Center for Naval Analyses conducted a study to identify and analyze alternative ways the Marine Corps might consider to improve its ability to conduct Humanitarian Assistance Operations (HAOs). To achieve this objective we (1) examined how the military has conducted HAOs in the past; (2) identified alternative ways the military can conduct these operations; and (3) assessed the relative costs of these alternatives in terms of changes in organizations, education and training, doctrine and documentation, and equipment and supplies. This paper addresses how the Marines and the military in general can improve their ability to plan an HAO. It is one of a series of papers on the U.S. Marine Corps and HAOs.

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# Contents

# Summary

The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) conducted a study to identify and analyze alternative ways the Marine Corps might consider to improve its ability to conduct humanitarian assistance operations (HAOs). To achieve this objective we (1) examined how the military has conducted HAOs in the past; (2) identified alternative ways the military can conduct these operations; and (3) assessed the relative costs of these alternatives in terms of changes in organization, education and training, doctrine and documentation, and equipment and supplies. This study is co-sponsored by the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF).

This paper addresses how the Marines and the military in general can improve their ability to plan an HAO. It is one of a series of papers on the U.S. Marine Corps and HAOs. Other papers in this series address legal issues, training, psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs, logistics and engineering, command relationships, measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and coordination with relief organizations during HAOs [1–7]. A summary of the key findings from this series of papers and the entire study can be found in [8].

## Study approach

We first determined the tasks required for planning an HAO by researching documentation and briefings on past HAO operations, exercises, and seminar games. We focused on the tasks that are different for HAOs. For HAO planning, these differences are significant. Given these tasks, we sought alternative ways to address them. These alternatives came from the relief community, U.S. military services, and foreign militaries through operations, exercises, literature, and conferences. We then determined the cost of these alternative ways to address the tasks in terms of changes in organization, education and training, doctrine and documentation, and equipment and supplies.

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# Key HAO planning findings

Appendix A shows the planning tasks required for HAOs that we identified. We found that the major planning tasks are as follows:

- Obtain assessment information

- Develop the mission statement

- Identify mission requirements

- Determine capabilities to meet mission requirements

- Develop an information campaign plan

- Coordinate with the relief community and the host nation.

These broad planning tasks are needed for warfighting operations, but the specific requirements to conduct these tasks differ considerably for HAOs. Throughout these tasks there is a need for information and coordination.

More types of information are needed for HAOs, and getting these types of information requires using additional sources of information, specifically, open-source information. Many organizations, including relief organizations, the UN, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), provide relevant information over the Internet. This information includes cultural assessments, location of displaced populations, and humanitarian needs of the population. Other organizations, such as the relief community, can be consulted to determine what information is biased and what types of information are relevant to the humanitarian situation. Members of the intelligence community should think of themselves as the information community for HAOs. They should gather, analyze, and fuse the information so that the other planning tasks we described can be facilitated.

To meet these information requirements, the intelligence community needs be educated. This education could take place through course work, additional intelligence documentation, and exercises.

HAOs involve many organizations, so coordination during planning is critical. The fundamental coordination steps required for HAOs mirror the crisis action planning (CAP) process, but with different players and a different focus at each step. The above paragraph describes the need to get information from nontraditional sources, such as the relief community. This information could be gathered during the situation development and crisis-assessment phases. During course-of-action development and selection and execution planning, all the players in the HAO should coordinate their actions. The operational planning teams (OPTs) at the Commander in Chief (CINC) and Joint Task Force (JTF) levels should be integrated with representation from the relief community, U.S. Government, UN, host nation, and so forth. If these groups cannot be present, the military should consult extensively with them and the disaster assistance response team (DART) in country. These players should be in the plan and in the planning. In addition, the military should coordinate with these players to understand their capabilities and to ensure that they do not undermine and duplicate these players' efforts. This will lead to economy of force.

The follow-on organization (such as the UN, host nation, or relief community) to the military also should be represented in the OPT. Coordinating with the follow-on organization during mission planning can help the military develop an end state that can be sustained or built on by the follow-on organization(s) or host nation. The military's *long-term* mission success will depend on this sustainability.

Coordination with the policy-makers during planning is also needed. Policy-makers determine objectives, and thus the military's role in an HAO. The military mission statement should be in accord with the political objectives. Political-military coordination is key to policy-making, and policy-makers should understand how their policy decisions interact with, affect, and create operational requirements and situations. A political advisor assigned to the JTF could help address this requirement at no cost to the military. In addition, the CINC and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) could facilitate this coordination.

# Introduction

This paper presents results from a study undertaken by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) at the request of Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). The primary objective of the study was to identify and analyze some alternative ways that the Marine Corps and the military in general could improve their ability to conduct humanitarian assistance operations (HAOs). To meet this objective, we performed the following:

- Examined how the military has conducted HAOs in the past

- Identified alternative ways the military can conduct these operations

- Assessed the relative costs of these alternatives in terms of changes in organization, education and training, doctrine and documentation, and equipment and supplies.

This paper addresses ways that the Marines and the military in general can *improve their ability to plan an HAO*. It is one of a series of papers on the subject of the U.S. Marine Corps and HAOs. Other papers in this series address legal, training, psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs, logistics and engineering, measures of effectiveness, coordinating with relief organizations, and command and coordination in HAOs [1–7]. A composite summary of the key insights from these papers can be found in [8].[1]

Before discussing the methodology and analysis results from the study, we should first define humanitarian assistance. This definition is taken from [11].

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1. We also analyzed the U.S. Marine Corps and domestic operations. This analysis is documented in [9, 10].

> Humanitarian Assistance includes programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions...that present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property...The assistance provided [by U.S. forces] is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities, or agencies that may have the primary responsibility of providing humanitarian assistance.

This definition should be kept in mind when reading this paper.

# Methodology

To meet the project's objectives in the area of planning, we began our analysis by developing a list of planning tasks and supporting requirements based on tasks typically performed by the Marines and the military in general in past HAOs, exercises, and seminar games. A comprehensive list of the planning tasks and requirements that are different for HAOs (versus warfighting operations) can be found in appendix A. Table 1 lists the operations and exercises we examined. Our sources of information included the Joint Universal Lessons Learned (JULLS) database, after-action reports, open literature, and CNA observations and findings from participation in real-world operations and exercises. (See the bibliography and references for a selected list of sources.)

Table 1.   Humanitarian assistance operations and exercises

| Operations | Exercises |
|---|---|
| Provide Comfort | Emerald Express '94 |
| Sea Angel | CNA seminar games |
| Fiery Vigil | Emerald Express '95 |
| Operation GTMO | |
| Restore Hope | |
| Uphold Democracy | |
| United Shield | |

The exercises listed on the right in table 1 warrant some explanation. Emerald Express '94 was the first exercise in a series of yearly exercises sponsored by I MEF to address HAOs. Emerald Express '94 provided a scenario similar to the one in Somalia to address lessons learned from that operation. Several CNA analysts on the HAO study team participated in this exercise and documented the results in [12].

To bring out HAO issues that were not addressed in Somalia and past HAOs, the HAO study team developed a seminar game. It contained a crisis action planning cell that consisted of typical participants in a JTF planning cell and representation from nongovernmental organizations/private voluntary organizations/international organizations (NGOs/PVOs/IOs), the UN, State Department, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) within the State Department. The results of this seminar game are presented in [13].

Emerald Express '95 (EE 95) was the second annual HAO exercise sponsored by I MEF. This time the exercise was in the form of a conference with cosponsorship from the State Department Office of Intelligence and Research. The purpose of EE 95 was not to bring up HAO issues, but to address issues already discussed. These issues were addressed through working groups. CNA provided 15 analysts to support this exercise. The results and analysis from the exercise are documented in [14, 15].

After we identified HAO planning tasks and supporting requirements to conduct these tasks, we then determined whether the Marine Corps meets these planning tasks and requirements, and how it currently conducts them. We focused on planning tasks and requirements for HAOs, which differ from warfighting operations. We then identified alternative ways for the Marine Corps to conduct these planning tasks and to meet the supporting requirements that would improve its ability to develop an HAO plan. To determine these alternatives, we looked at how other organizations conduct humanitarian operations, as well as other ideas that have been brought out during exercises, seminar games, conferences, and in the literature. Finally, we thought about the cost considerations associated with the

alternatives in terms of organization, education and training, doctrine and documentation, and equipment and supplies.

# Overview

This research memorandum presents planning tasks and requirements supporting these tasks that the Marines or other members of the military should focus on when planning for HAOs.

The planning requirements for HAOs seem to fall under six tasks.

The first task is to begin planning, which requires the military to *obtain assessment information.* A good assessment of the situation is imperative during warfighting operations. However, in HAOs more information is needed than the enemy order of battle (if there is one) and maps of the local geography. To avoid duplication of effort, the military needs assessment information on the functions that the host nation or the relief community is performing. Assessment information also is needed for all remaining major planning tasks.

The second task is to *develop a clear, realistic mission statement,* which is important for any type of operation. However, for HAOs the military's interpretation of the mission statement may differ from what the higher levels of command intended. A mission statement can be focused or general. In both cases, problems can occur.

The third major planning task is to obtain an accurate assessment of the situation to *identify mission requirements* for conducting the HAO. Mission requirements also should be identified when planning for a warfighting operation; but the types of mission requirements for HAOs are different. The Marines and military will be supporting the local population, and may be supporting and operating with NGOs/PVOs/IOs, as well as coalition partners, the media, government agencies, and contractors.

After identifying mission requirements, the military should *determine the capabilities* necessary to meet these mission requirements, which is the fourth task in the planning process.

The fifth major planning task is for the military to prepare an *information campaign/strategy* to convey its mission to the local population. Again, an information campaign is not unique to humanitarian operations, but HAOs have additional objectives. The broad objectives for the information campaign/strategy in HAOs is to help provide security for the relief force, minimize casualties, facilitate relief operations, promote public health and hygiene, and increase the cooperation of the local population.

Successful performance of these five broad planning tasks depends on coordination among all the players in an HAO. *Coordination* is the sixth major planning task. Coordination in HAOs differs from that in warfighting missions because HAOs have many more players. The military should coordinate during the planning phase with the relief community or host nation it will be supporting. Not only are the relief community and the host nation good sources of information, but they also have capabilities that are used during the HAO. In fact, these capabilities may already be in place long before the military intervenes. In this case, the military should coordinate with the relief community so as not to undermine the relief structure already in place.

# Road map

The remainder of this paper discusses each of the six major planning tasks. For each task, we present supportive planning requirements, alternative ways to meet these requirements, and cost considerations in terms of organization, education and training, doctrine and documentation, and supplies and equipment. After discussing each major planning task, we present a wrap-up and our recommendations.

# Obtain assessment information

The military requires information to develop an effective plan that will address the situation in the host nation. The following sections discuss information requirements and alternative ways the military can obtain assessment information.

## Supporting requirements

During the planning process, the JTF, JCS, and CINC need an accurate *assessment of the situation* and *an understanding of the humanitarian needs being addressed* by organizations already in the host nation before the military intervenes. The military can then identify military requirements for the HAO. These organizations could include NGOs/PVOs/IOs, the host nation, the UN, U.S. Government agencies, and foreign militaries. The following sections describe these two assessment areas in more detail.

### Situation assessment

In a warfighting operation, planners are most interested in the threat assessment, and in particular, the enemy order of battle. Although security is an issue during any military operation, including HAOs, a much broader assessment is needed for the many facets of a humanitarian operation.The facets include the host nation's culture, infrastructure, economic situation, agriculture and food situation, public health and sanitation of the population, and lines of communications [16].

Because HAOs deal primarily with the general host-nation population, the military should understand the particular culture of the people who are receiving assistance. Understanding the cultural needs of the population and how that population conducts itself can influence military planning for the necessary forces, supplies, and equipment. For example, during Operation Guantanamo (GTMO)

the migrant population (consisting of Haitians) preferred food prepared by its own people. Also, use of the laundry system prepared for the Haitians was curtailed because, within the context of the Haitian culture, laundry and washing practices serve as a social function that the Haitians preferred to conduct by themselves. Understanding the culture, in this example, could lead to requiring less laundry equipment and fewer personnel for cooking and maintaining laundry equipment. In addition, accommodating these cultural sensitivities leads to higher morale among the assisted people and easier control of affected populations [17].

As in warfighting operations, planners also need to understand the infrastructure situation that will affect operations. But instead of the military making an assessment, for example, to map routes and conduct limited repairs of roads for warfighting operations, it may be asked to repair and clear infrastructure for the long term and for continued civilian use [12]. Roads required to transport supplies may need repairs, rubble may have to be cleared from the roads, water pipes may need repair, airports and seaports may need modifications and repairs, and so forth. These infrastructure assessments will affect many of the logistics, engineering, and transportation requirements. The military should also understand that other players in an HAO may create competing demands on ports and airfields. The military should accommodate these competing requirements in planning force movements [12, 14, 15].

The military also needs an assessment of the security situation to conduct planning. The military is probably most comfortable with this facet of humanitarian operations. However, there are differences in the conduct of security and, in some cases, safety operations. The threat may be in the form of disorganized banditry rather than organized trained armies. Visibility of troops on the ground in HAOs (unlike stealthiness in warfighting operations) can have a significant impact on security in the host nation [2]. It is also important for the military to understand the economic situation. A poor economic situation can lead to an increase in violence over limited resources. The military could plan, for example, to employ the local population to help meet humanitarian needs (repair roads, distribute food, and so forth).

The military should also understand the public health situation of the population. Although it may not be tasked to directly address the public health needs of the population, public health problems, such as starvation and disease, may be the reason that the military was asked to intervene. Starvation and disease could be caused by poor sanitation. The military should have a clear understanding of the overarching humanitarian goals of its mission, even though its tasks to address those goals may be indirect [6].

## Understand which humanitarian needs are being met by relief organizations and the host nation

Many relief organizations or the host-nation government may be present before the military intervenes, and will remain after the military leaves. The military will probably have little influence over (and will not control) the relief organizations' efforts. However, because the military usually supports the relief effort already underway, it should not displace the efforts of these organizations. Therefore, the military first needs to understand which humanitarian needs are already being met by the relief organizations or the host nation, as well as which organizations are in the host nation and the needs that each is addressing. This information facilitates economy of force, assets, and capabilities later in the planning process. The military can then determine its role in meeting the humanitarian requirements [11, 14, 15].

# Alternatives

Obtaining all the necessary information for an accurate assessment of the humanitarian situation through "traditional" military channels is not always possible. The intelligence community should become the "information" community and tap nontraditional sources to obtain the required information to support the development of an effective HAO plan. The requirements being met by the relief community or host nation also can be assessed by using nontraditional sources. Many sources of information exist; the information from these sources needs to be gathered, fused, analyzed, and disseminated. The sources and the means to conduct these steps need to be defined.

## Information coordination

Much of the information needed for HAO planning can be obtained from open sources. Ideally, the military would prefer to have one place where they could get the information— where both reference material would be stored and current information could be added. The Internet could serve this purpose.

The intelligence community should understand that the Internet can be a useful source of information and also can be used to disseminate information. Many players in an HAO have home pages and display current information in humanitarian crisis areas. These are valuable sources of information.

Figure 1 illustrates the intelligence community pulling information from sources and potential sources using the Internet to meet the information requirements discussed earlier. Those circles with darker outlines are sources of information identified by the study team that display information on crisis areas. Those in circles without the darker outlines are potential sources of information that could be up on the Internet. The sources of information in this picture will be described shortly. The costs associated with this alternative are *education and doctrine* to provide guidance to the intelligence community on the sources and types of information available. *Equipment* costs may be associated with using the Internet.

We recognize that the intelligence community could quickly become overwhelmed with information, and they could have difficulty sorting and fusing it with their limited resources and capabilities. In addition, they would probably be unable to adequately monitor potential crisis areas to support deliberate planning because of limited resources. Problems also could arise when fusing the information because there may be excessive, or perhaps partial, uncoordinated information. This would make is difficult for the intelligence officers on a potential JTF or CINC staff to get an accurate situation assessment.

Another alternative to help solve the problem of overburdening the intelligence community was to develop a Humanitarian Assistance Information Fusion Center (HAIFC). This alternative was first discussed at EE 95 [14,15]. At EE 95, use of the Internet as a means of

Figure 1. Intelligence community open-source alternative

Traditional sources

Ambassador

DART

Intelligence Community

Country team

U.S. Gov't

InterAction

Media

USAID

UN HCWEB

CARE

ICRC

Other NGOs

▨ INTERNET
◯ Potential Internet information source
⬭ Existing Internet information source
▢ Organization
┈▶ Intelligence pull
━▶ Intelligence push

collecting and disseminating information for HAOs was a captivating idea for both policy-and operations-level people. This complements this study's findings of identifying the types and sources of information needed for HAOs. Figure 2 shows the combined findings from our analysis and EE 95 results. The following paragraph explains the concept.

The HAIFC would be responsible for gathering all the information through the Internet and through traditional military intelligence sources, fusing that information into an analyzed picture, and the disseminating that fused picture over the Internet. The many players in an HAO would then have the information necessary to better plan and conduct an HAO. The HAIFC would be a Washington-based standing body responsible for keeping an up-to-date fused picture, with all the necessary information components, for a variety of

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Figure 2. Humanitarian Assistance Information Fusion Center alternative



INTERNET

⬭ Potential Internet information source

⬭ Existing Internet information source

☐ Organization

potential crisis regions around the world. This picture would be monitored for potential crisis indicators. If the military is asked to intervene, the HAIFC would support crisis action planning. It would also support deliberate planning for potential areas for military intervention. Participants in the HAIFC would include representatives from the Department of Defense, Defence Intelligence Agency, State Department, and other U.S. Government agencies. These participants were suggested in EE 95. From our analysis, we think that PVOs/IOs also should be represented because they can contribute by helping sort through biased data, interpret the data, and provide insight on the types of data that should be collected and analyzed.

To determine what areas the HAIFC should monitor, and what crisis indicators it should look for, participants in EE 95 suggested that a policy-level mechanism be established to address these policy issues. EE 95 participants called this the U.S. Interagency Information

Coordination Center (USIICC) (see figure 2). This policy body would be a U.S. interagency body that would meet periodically. It would direct and be one of the primary consumers of the HAIFC. It would have close contacts with the UN at the policy level because the UN is frequently involved in operations that have or will have U.S. military intervention.

Although the Marine Corps could not implement an HAIFC and USIICC on its own, it would certainly benefit from these organizations. The Marine Corps could submit these ideas up their chain of command. If an HAIFC is formed, the costs associated with it would be to provide *representation* to the HAIFC, and *to educate and provide doctrine* to the HAIFC personnel on the sources and types of information needed to support deliberate planning and CAP.

## Sources of information

The military should first look at sources of information they may not be accustomed to using when gathering intelligence information for planning HAOs. We identify four such general sources of information in the following paragraphs.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) deploys a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to assess the situation in a country where the United States is considering humanitarian intervention. To get the information needed for CAP, the planners should interact extensively with the DART team [16]. USAID provides information over the Internet on crisis regions around the world. The military can use this information to support deliberate planning and CAP.

Another source of information is the country team, which is the "senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission (the U.S. Ambassador), and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the Chair of the U.S. diplomatic mission." [2] The country team is supposed to provide rapid

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2. This comes directly from Joint Pub 1-02.

interagency consultation and action on recommendations from the field, and effective execution of U.S. missions, programs, and policies. This team consists of representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies present in the country. The military should coordinate with the country team to get its assessment of the situation for planning purposes. There is virtually *no additional cost* to this alternative because the military is already required to get information from the country team. However, the composition of the country team varies from country to country, depending on the specific U.S. national interests in the country. In many cases, the country team is less than adequate for every need [11]. In some cases, it may not exist; it may be inoperative because of damage or casualties from natural or man-made disaster; or it may simply be weak or inadequately trained in crisis management. The country team's input should be one of many inputs into the information gathering process.

Often NGOs/PVOs/IOs have been providing relief to crisis areas for years before the military is asked to intervene. They probably can provide a more detailed assessment of the situation. In many cases, they will know the condition of the roads, ports, and airfields; the locations of displaced persons; the culture of the people; the language; the security problem areas, and so forth. Many NGOs/PVOs/IOs provide situation reports on the Internet or they send them using the Internet. In addition, many relief organizations, such as InterAction, the UN, NGOs, and other organizations, provide this information on the Internet. The military can easily tap these sources for planning purposes.[3]

Other sources could include neighboring nations of the host nation and U.S. businessmen in country. Some of the major costs associated with tapping these nontraditional sources are *education and doctrine* for the intelligence community, and *communication equipment* to facilitate tapping into these information sources. Some sources may

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3. Some of the Internet home pages are as follows:
   For USAID: gopher://gaia.info.usaid.gov:70/11/human_ass_n_post_trans/ofda%a$
   For the UN: gopher//gopher.unicc.org:70/11/HCWEB
   For InterAction: http://www.vita.org/iaction/iaction.html

require *liaison officers* to facilitate communication and coordination. The intelligence community can seek out these sources.

Another alternative, which is based on another proposal discussed during EE 95 [14, 15], is to form an interagency assessment team (IAT) to inject more and better information into the process that decides whether a U.S. Government intervention should take place. The IAT would consist of U.S. Government agencies that could be involved in a potential HAO (including DOD) and NGOs/PVOs/IOs. The purpose of the assessment would be to expose all the participants to the same ground picture in the affected country or countries. Appropriate decision-makers would use the resulting single report to determine whether U.S. intervention should take place. If an IAT is developed, the military could also use the IAT assessment for planning purposes. The costs to the military would be to *provide representation* and *provide doctrine and education* to the representative on the IAT. Other nonmilitary costs associated with this IAT option would be to develop a new *organization,* which includes purchasing *equipment* (computers, phones, copiers, etc.) and providing *documentation and/or education* for those on the IAT. Again, the Marines or even the military may not be responsible for forming this organization, but they could express the need for this organization up the chain of command to the NSC.

Finally, a more traditional alternative source is for Special Forces (SF) to conduct an assessment, particularly if the military needs a rapid, accurate assessment, as in the case of Sea Angel or Fiery Vigil. Appropriate NGOs and USAID representatives, a motor transport, or helicopter pilot could augment the SF if appropriate for the situation. The cost to the military would be to *provide representation* for the assessment team and *documentation and/or education* for the SF on the types of information needed.

# Develop the mission statement

When a JTF begins planning, it is usually given preliminary mission statements from the CINC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JTF develops its own mission statement (at the operational and tactical level) based on the CINC's and JCS's statement, as well as assessment information [18]. However, the supporting requirements for developing an HAO mission statement are different from those for developing a warfighting mission statement. The following section explains these differences and what can be done about them.

## Supporting requirements

For many HAOs, NGOs/PVOs/IOs, the UN or the host nation requests assistance, thus *the military plays a supporting role* in humanitarian operations, whereas it is the leader in warfighting operations. Also, in HAOs the mission statement should state that *the military will transition to the host nation or follow-on organization. The host nation or relief community should sustain the tasks that the military was conducting* (if these tasks are not yet complete). Finally, *the JTF end state in the mission statement needs to be in line with the higher commands' end state.* The third requirement is necessary in warfighting missions, but in past HAOs and exercises it has not always taken place. The following sections will expand on each of these requirements.

### Support, not supplant

When developing the mission statement, military planners should keep in mind that the military is supporting and providing assistance to the host nation or relief organizations [11, 12, 13, 19, 20, 21]. The host nation or relief organizations may already have a relief structure in place. The military should support this relief structure, not replace it. In addition, the military can temporarily fill gaps in the relief structure identified by the host nation or relief organization. The concept that the military is supporting other organizations should be

reflected in the mission statement [12]. Also, for planning purposes, the military should understand the relief structure composition and what the relief community is doing, as discussed in the previous section. This will lead to economy of force. The mission statement should reflect this supporting role.

This is not just a military problem. At the policy level, when developing their mission statement, policy-makers should focus on requirements unique to the military to support the existing relief effort or host-nation infrastructure already in place [22]. Also, policy-makers should look at military capabilities that support other organizations, which will multiply the effect of the overall relief effort [14, 15]. In the latter case, other organizations may be able to fulfill the requirements, but the U.S. military may be the organization of choice in a crisis situation because of timeliness, organization, and other reasons. The military should provide the policy-makers with the appropriate information on its capabilities so that they can make reasonable decisions for military commitments to HAOs.

## Sustainability of accomplishments

Sustainability of accomplishments means that the military should not take on tasks that are unsustainable in the long term by the host nation or relief organizations. This does not include those tasks that do not require sustainment (such as immunizations).

Why should the military consider sustainability of accomplishments by the follow-on organizations when developing its mission statement? Sustainability is not always a popular idea within the military because some think that it implies a longer-term intervention. Considering sustainability of accomplishments might shorten the military's stay because the follow-on organization may be more willing to take on the military's functions if they know they can sustain these functions, i.e., transition could conceivably take place earlier. It could also lead to a more successful transition from the military to the host nation or follow-on relief organizations. This is because the military will be working with the host nation or relief organizations, rather than working independently. Also, if the military does not think and plan beyond its departure, the host nation could quickly return to the

crisis state that initially prompted military intervention [11]. The military might be called in again to intervene, which is not a desirable situation. Another reason for considering sustainability of accomplishments is that the general public may view the military's mission as a failure if conditions deteriorate after the military leaves the host nation. Bad press is undesirable. The military should include the need for sustainability of accomplishments in its mission statement, and in planning and execution to avoid these undesirable situations.

For example, in Somalia, the military provided fresh water to the population by using reverse-osmosis water-purification units (ROWPUs). The military knew that it would eventually have to take the ROWPUs when it withdrew from Somalia, so it drilled wells to provide water for the population. However, some time after the military left, the pumps used in the wells broke. No one knew how to maintain the pumps to get water. In this case, the military gave some thought to the situation beyond its departure, i.e., it drilled wells to provide water. But it did not think about the level of technology of the population and the relief organizations needed to maintain the pumps, and did not provide them with the equipment and training needed for this maintenance. Consequently, water is once again a problem in Somalia.

## End state

The mission statement should also indicate the desired military end state. This end state should be in line with the political objectives. The policy-makers, like the military, need to think about the situation in the country beyond the military's departure from the area when they are planning for an HAO. If the policy-makers do not think beyond the military's departure, the country could return to a crisis situation [23].

The desired end state for military intervention is related to understanding sustainability of accomplishments by follow-on organizations. In general, the military mission end state is defined as when the military is not needed because the host nation, UN, or other organization can take over the military's functions or the functions the military was conducting are no longer needed. Achieving such an end

state requires working with the follow-on organization/host nation during mission planning. It also means that the military should understand what the policy-makers are using to determine when the political end state has been achieved.

To help measure the military's progress toward its end state (when transition can take place), the military, the follow-on organization or host-nation government, and other key HAO players should develop measures of effectiveness (MOEs) before and during mission planning. These MOEs should reflect the military's progress toward its end state (transition), as well as the overall humanitarian progress that the policy-makers will be examining. In addition, because the military mission is to support the host nation or the relief organizations, MOEs should be developed for specific tasks the military will be asked to conduct. MOEs in each of these areas—tasks, transition, and humanitarian—can be used to track progress toward the military's end state.

For example, the military may be asked to clear debris from roads so that relief convoys can bring food to food distribution centers to feed the people and reduce starvation. In this case, a task MOE would be the percentage of roads cleared of debris;[4] a transition measure would be the percentage of crews made up of host nation or relief-organization personnel who are clearing debris;[5] and an overarching humanitarian MOE (that policy-makers are inclined to examine) would be the starvation rate the humanitarian effort is ultimately trying to reduce. More extensive discussion on MOEs is presented in [6].

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4. Tons of debris cleared is not a task MOE; it is a level-of-effort measure that does not reflect what the military is trying to accomplish.

5. Transition measures are not MOEs. They do not measure the effectiveness of the transition; they only show that a transition is taking place.

# Alternatives

The military can meet the mission-statement requirements in several ways. The following sections describe a few of the alternative ways to meet these requirements.

## Support, not supplant

To ensure that the mission statement reflects the fact that the military will provide assistance (i.e., not take over the operation, and will support (i.e., not supplant) the relief effort already in place in the host-nation, representatives from the relief organizations in theater or host-nation representatives could be included in the operational planning teams (OPTs), both at the JTF and CINC, during mission planning. These representatives could provide information on the existing relief effort; where military help is most needed; the customs and culture of the population; the locations of displaced persons and refugees, and so forth. Understanding this information can lead to economy of force. During past operations, involving NGOs/PVOs/IOs in the planning process was rarely considered. However, during CNA's seminar games [13], the NGOs/PVOs/IOs were represented in the crisis action planning (CAP) cell and contributed greatly to these planning efforts. They educated the military players in different types of HAOs and what typical requirements are needed for specific HAOs. Security classification may be an issue, but, if sources of information are not revealed, intelligence information often becomes unclassified. Also, many representatives from OFDA hold security clearances.

A more viable alternative may be for the CINC and JTF OPTs to communicate extensively with the DART and the country team (if there is one and it is adequate) to get the needed information for CAP, as discussed earlier. This may be a better alternative because of timing (usually there is a very limited lead time); NGOs/PVOs/IOs not wanting to sacrifice a person for military planning purposes; or the fact that the situation in the crisis area is changing rapidly (the NGO representatives on the OPT would not be up to date on recent events). In addition, the OPT would get a broader perspective of the situation than they would from a few NGO inputs on an OPT. The DART and

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country team, in turn, would need to have extensive liaison with the relief community in the host nation.

For the former alternative, the cost involved for including relief organizations and the host nation (if appropriate) in the OPT would be some *education and doctrine* costs for the military planning staff and the outside organization staff to facilitate interoperability between the military and relief organizations and the host nation. Also, the OPT *organization* would have considerably more representation than just the military.

The latter alternative would also involve *education* costs to teach the military how to work with the DART and the country team. A *liaison* officer from the OPTs may be needed to coordinate with the DART and country team. *Equipment* costs for communicating between the OPT and the DART and country team, such as phones or the Internet, may be necessary.

## Sustainability of accomplishments

The mission statement should address the need for sustainability of accomplishments by the follow-on organization or host nation. The military could begin mission planning with the organization(s) or host nation that will be assuming its responsibilities when it leaves. Thus, what the military needs to accomplish at the outset of the operation will be understood by all. These organizations could be part of the OPT, or they could act as consultants to the OPT or Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF). In the latter case, the OPTs would need to communicate extensively with the follow-on organization. The associated costs would be *education* and *doctrine* to facilitate interoperability with the follow-on organization or host nation. If the follow-on organization or host nation is included in the OPT, there will also be *organization* costs. If not, there may be *equipment* costs to facilitate communication.

Because reconstruction and rehabilitation are not, in general, a U.S. military speciality (except for the Army Corps of Engineers and one civil affairs unit), the costs of developing such expertise is high. Thus, rehabilitation experts or consultants should be brought into the

planning cells to help integrate military efforts with long-term goals. This alternative would have *organization* costs.

## End state

The military end state should be in line with the policy-makers' end state. One solution to meeting this requirement is to have a highly qualified political advisor with the CJTF during mission planning (as well as during the operation). This would help communicate the operational realities to the policy-makers. All CINCs already have political advisors. The cost associated with this alternative would be some *education* costs for interoperability and organizational changes to the CJTF staff.

Some work has already been done to develop meaningful MOEs [6, 12, 24]. However, appropriate MOEs for a specific intervention would need to be developed during CAP. Guidance on how to do this is provided in [6]. Representatives from the key players would need to work together to develop mission-appropriate MOEs. The costs associated with this solution would be *organizational* (developing a new organization during CAP) and the cost of developing *documentation*.

# Identify mission requirements

When identifying mission requirements during mission planning, the military needs to remember that it is usually being called to intervene as a source of last resort because the situation is desperate [11, 22, 25]. Understanding the situation and what needs are already being met by the host nation or relief community is the first step in identifying mission requirements, as discussed earlier. The following sections describe mission requirements and alternative ways to meet these mission requirements.

## Supporting requirements

The military needs to understand the types of humanitarian crises and typical mission requirements needed in these crises. This may sound trivial, but it isn't always obvious. For example, during CNA's seminar game [13] for an earthquake scenario, the military started to, plan for bringing food to the earthquake victims. As one of the private voluntary organizations' representatives at the games pointed out, food assistance usually is not needed after an earthquake, but transport of food already in the country is needed because roads may be damaged, thus obstructing civilian traffic.

The military may not always be in the best position to determine the HAO mission requirements. The relief community in the host nation, UN agencies, or the host-nation government may be in a better position to determine the requirements in some areas, such as health care and food. The military therefore needs to interact with these organizations to determine mission requirements above and beyond what is needed for sustaining the forces [11, 21, 25].

Some of the areas in which the military should identify mission requirements to support the relief effort include:

- Logistics (including food and supplies) [4]

- Engineering [4]

- Transportation [4]

- Security [2, 12, 14, 15]

- Health [14, 15]

- Civil affairs/PSYOP [3]

- Media/public affairs [14, 15]

- Legal issues [1].

Identifying mission requirements in the above areas may also be necessary for planning a warfighting operation, but the requirements themselves in these categories may be very different for HAOs. For example, the PSYOP campaign for an HAO may differ because the military will support this population rather than oppose it; also, the population needs to understand the military's intentions [3]. In addition, potential legal issues are present during HAOs that are different from those in warfighting operations [1, 26, 27, 28].

The military also should identify mission requirements for supporting coalition partners and NGOs/PVOs/IOs (if they request support) in the same areas listed above.

# Alternatives

The military can identify some mission requirements through an accurate assessment of the situation and an understanding of the humanitarian needs already adequately addressed by the host nation or relief community. The same alternatives for obtaining assessment information discussed earlier apply here. However, because the military is not yet on the ground during mission planning, it may not be in the best position to determine and prioritize the humanitarian mission requirements needing military attention. As discussed earlier, interacting and coordinating with those organizations already in the host nation can help identify these humanitarian mission requirements. Including relief organizations that were in the host nation and/or host-nation personnel in the OPT, or using them as consultants, can also solve the problem of identifying mission requirements

within the host nation. The cost considerations associated with these alternatives are the same as discussed in the section on mission statement.

The military may also be asked to support NGOs/PVOs/IOs and coalition partners during the intervention. The military can address mission requirements for supporting these players by including these organizations and forces in the planning process via the OPT, consultants, or frequent communications. See the section on mission statement for associated cost considerations.

# Determine capabilities to meet mission requirements

During CAP for warfighting operations, the military determines which capabilities it needs to bring to an operation to meet mission requirements. However, in HAOs the need to support, and not supplant, the relief structure already in place, and to have the follow-on organization or host nation sustain military accomplishments when the military leaves, make it difficult to determine capabilities and match appropriate forces to meet requirements [12]. In contrast to traditional operations, in HAOs military planners must recognize that military assets are not the only viable or necessary means to meet the HAO's requirements. Thus, when deciding required capabilities, planners should look outside the U.S. (or even allied) military capabilities to the capabilities of other government agencies or NGOs/PVOs/IOs to meet these requirements. The following sections describe the requirements and some alternatives for determining capabilities to meet mission requirements.

## Supporting requirements

Other organizations will be involved in an HAO. These organizations could include other U.S. Government departments and agencies, coalition forces, and NGOs/PVOs/IOs that have capabilities. The military may not need to meet all the mission requirements because others may already be meeting some of them, as previously discussed. The military should focus on the requirements that need to be met by the military forces (both U.S. and coalition forces). In addition, the organization most capable of meeting a requirement may not be the "best" choice because of other factors, such as timeliness, politics, relationship with the host nation, command relationships, cost, and so forth. For example, the U.S. military may be the most capable force to guard an airport. However, because of the political need to include

coalition forces in an operation, another country's military force could adequately guard an airport (even though they may not be the *most* capable) [14, 15].

The military capabilities needed to meet HAO requirements are also different from those needed for warfighting operations. For example, there is usually much greater emphasis on logistics and engineering capabilities in HAOs than in warfighting operations. In some HAOs, such as Sea Angel, the combat capabilities of the force are virtually irrelevant.

# Alternatives

Determining capabilities to meet the identified mission requirements can also be done within the OPTs or through coordination with other players during the planning process. Some coalition partners could participate in the OPTs during the planning process, as coalition capabilities could be significant. Other partners could be consulted. Interagency coordination should take place during CAP to determine the capabilities that other agencies could contribute to meet the mission requirements. This coordination could take place either through representation on the OPT or through extensive coordination by other means. The cost associated with involving non-military players in the OPT is a change in the OPT *organization*. For both the OPT option and the coordination through communication option, *doctrine and education* would be needed to ensure compatible interoperability. For the coordination option, additional equipment might be needed to facilitate communication.

# Develop an information campaign plan

## Planning requirements

Part of the planning process in any warfighting operation or HAO involves developing an information campaign plan. However, in HAOs such a plan is different because the military will be working with and supporting the host-nation population—the target audience for the PSYOP campaign [3, 14, 15].

After the military understands the mission, the situation, and the players, the next step in planning the information campaign is developing a message to support the mission's objectives. Three pillars should be used to develop and convey this message: intelligence/information, PSYOP, and the media. Again, on the surface this requirement does not differ from a warfighting information campaign. However, with HAOs significant differences occur within each of these pillars [14, 15].

Intelligence/information is different because of the types of information needed for HAOs. The information on the situation as the military sees it should be widely disseminated at the unclassified level (unlike in warfighting operations) as discussed earlier [12, 14, 15, 16, 17].

PSYOP is the vital link to the population. The military needs to develop a clear theme, identify a target audience (the local population), and communicate the message of military intentions as widely as possible via appropriate means.

The media are key to the information campaign. They tell the story of the HAO. A media theme should be developed during the planning process in cooperation with the intelligence, PSYOP, and public affairs community [29]. This means that a public affairs officer should be assigned early in the process.

# Alternatives

As discussed, the three pillars to the information campaign are intelligence/information, PSYOP, and the media. An alternative way to meet the intelligence requirement has already been discussed. In addition, this information should be conveyed publicly.

To meet the PSYOP requirements of developing a clear theme and identifying a target audience and the appropriate means of communication requires access to PSYOP personnel. Currently, all the Marine PSYOP personnel are in the Naval Reserve, which will require a Reservist call-up for use (if not enough Reserve forces volunteer). The Marines could think about meeting the PSYOP personnel requirements by having easier access to the Marine Corps Reserve PSYOP personnel or by having greater access to the active Army PSYOP personnel. All three of these options would incur an *organizational* cost [3].

The media tell the story of the HAO. The military should embrace this opportunity to work with the media to convey an accurate story to the general public. To meet media requirements, the military should include them in the deployment, i.e., the military should plan for their billeting, and for transporting satellite dishes and other media equipment. In terms of cost, embracing the media requires additional *equipment, organization* (additional consideration for force flow), and *documentation* on how to handle the media in HAOs [14, 15].

To convey the message to the media, a public affairs officer (PAO) should be identified early in the warning order. Often the warning order reads, only, "PAO: TBD," which means the PAO has yet to be assigned. No additional cost is associated with this alternative.

# Coordinate

## Planning requirements

Throughout the previous sections, we've discussed the need for the military to coordinate during planning with the key players in an HAO. This requires coordination with the relief community or the host nation, coalition partners, and policy-makers during the planning process. The following sections discuss why the military needs to coordinate with these key players to develop an HAO plan [5, 7].

### Relief community and the host nation

We mentioned earlier that often a relief structure is already in place before the military is asked to intervene. Those organizations that are in the host nation (including the host-nation government, particularly for disaster relief) are valuable sources of information to facilitate developing the mission statement, assessing the situation, identifying requirements being met by other organizations already in the host nation, and identifying requirements for military crisis intervention. The relief community in theatre and/or the host nation can provide information, such as the culture of the host-nation population, the level of health that the population is accustomed to, the technology that the population is capable of sustaining, and so forth. The military needs to coordinate with the organizations in country to get this invaluable information. Relief-organization personnel can also provide invaluable information on "traditional" information needs, such as the quality and conditions of roads, ports, public services, and local contracting possibilities.

Often the military will transition its operations to the relief community, the UN, or the host nation. Thus, it needs to coordinate with them to understand what they are capable of sustaining. This will help the military develop an end state for the HAO.

The military also should coordinate with these organizations to convey military capabilities. The organizations in place may initially (and maybe throughout the intervention) know the HAO requirements and priorities. The military can then convey its capabilities to the relief community so that the relief community can request appropriate support to meet these requirements. In turn, the military can plan for these requirements. Coordination also allows integration of the military into the relief structure (i.e., support, not supplant).

## Coalition partners

Coalition partners can bring many capabilities to an HAO, but they can also bring with them additional requirements for U.S. military support. The U.S. Marines and the military should understand both of these aspects when planning for an HAO. For example, in Somalia one coalition partner's forces arrived in some cases without shoes or weapons. The U.S. forces had to clothe and equip them. Many potential coalition partners have had considerable experience in HAOs and peacekeeping. Coordination with these partners may provide an opportunity for the U.S. forces to learn from their experience. To understand the coalition partners' capabilities and requirements, the U.S. military (including the Marines) should coordinate with them during planning.

The military also needs to coordinate with its coalition partners to establish common goals, to understand timelines for deployment, and to examine interoperability issues. Each coalition partner's status-of-forces agreements with the host nation and the United States, as well as the culture of these partners can affect interoperability [1].

## Policy-makers

The JTF (those who will be on the ground) should coordinate with the policy-makers (NCA, NSC, Congress, State Department via JCS) during mission planning for several reasons: When military commanders and planners are developing their mission statements, they should have a clear understanding of the political objectives for military intervention in an HAO, and particularly what the policy-makers see as the role of the military forces in this HAO. The military end state has to be consistent with the political end state. The MOEs

developed by the operational community (discussed earlier) need to be in line with the policy-makers' measures for determining when the military can make the transition from the HAO.

Policy-makers make decisions about military intervention based on what they know about the military. In some cases, their knowledge of the military is limited for issues such as the implications of coalition involvement and timelines for deployment. The U.S. military should educate policy-makers on operational implications of policy decisions so that political and operational requirements can be balanced [14, 15].

# Alternatives

Given the previous discussion on coordination requirements, it is clear that coordination needs to take place both within the U.S. chain of command and across the key players in an HAO. The fundamental coordination steps required for an HAO mirror the CAP process, but with different players and a different focus at each step. Mechanisms are needed to facilitate this coordination.

Figure 3 shows the CAP steps, the coordination process needed for HAOs as identified by this study, and potential mechanisms to facilitate this coordination. The outlined circles are new mechanisms. The white circles are existing organizations that need to change.

We have already discussed alternative solutions to coordination with the U.S. Government agencies, in-theatre relief organizations, or the host nation for situation development and crisis assessment. The intelligence community or the HAIFC would gather and fuse traditional and nontraditional types of information from all appropriate sources. Also, we've discussed the reasons why the relief organizations and/or host nation should be included in the OPT, or be consultants to the OPT. These players would be part of course of action development and selection, and execution planning. These players need to be part of the planning and the plan. The same associated cost considerations for coordination within these organizations apply here.

Figure 3. Coordination mechanisms for crisis action planning



We also show the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in figure 3. This is an existing way to coordinate civil and military operations, although there is no standard way to set up a CMOC. [6] The CMOC focuses on coordination during HAO execution and is discussed in more detail in [5] and [8].

At the policy level, no mechanism exists to facilitate planning and execution coordination. An Executive Steering Group (ESG) could be formed during planning to establish common goals among the relief, the military, and the political communities. This group could set the tone for all participants in the operation. The ESG was initially discussed during CNA's HAO seminar game [13]. It was also

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6. III MEF has developed a standard operating procedure document for developing a CMOC. However, no Marine-wide or military-wide document exists, and in past operations CMOCs were set up ad hoc.

discussed during EE 95 [14, 15]. This group would consist of the senior military commander, CJTF, special representative to the secretary general, UN resident coordinator, USAID, IOs, U.S. Ambassador or special envoy, host-nation government representative, coalition representatives, NGO consortium, and others. Besides trying to establish a common goal, the ESG would also develop policy based on operations on the ground during the HAO, as depicted in figure 3.

The Marines would not directly form the ESG, but could bring this need to the attention of the international community. The cost considerations for this option would be *organization, education (to facilitate interoperability), and equipment (to facilitate communication).*

We discussed earlier a number of coordination requirements for the U.S. policy-makers, such as understanding the political objectives, having a consistent end state for the HAO, and educating the policy-makers in operational implications of policy. A suggestion was made during EE 95 to develop a Washington Coordination Group (WCG) consisting of representation from DOD, NSC, PVOs, USAID, Department of State (DOS), and others, as appropriate. Its primary function would be to provide headquarter-level coordination during military planning. This alternative would require the military to provide liaison officers from the CJTF who would be *educated* for this position. Policy-makers would incur *organization* costs. Another alternative would be to have a political advisor to the CJTF. This would not require any significant military costs.

To address the problem of educating the policy-makers in areas such as timelines, a high-level liaison officer should be taught to provide this *education.* Some of this education could be provided pre-crisis as part of a PME (professional military education) for policy-makers.

# Wrap-up

The general HAO planning requirements that are different from warfighting operations are shown in table 2. The alternatives and cost considerations also are presented.

Table 2.   Summary of planning requirements for HAOs

| Broad Require-ment | Requirements | Alternatives | Cost considerations |
|---|---|---|---|
| Obtain assessment informa-tion. | Collect situation assessment informa-tion using nontradi-tional sources and information. | 1. Have intelligence community interact with other organizations and use nontradi-tional sources to develop picture.<br>2. Develop standing organization to gather, fuse and disseminate a clear picture of crisis area(s).<br>3. Develop an interagency assessment team with representation from military, relief, and political communities to conduct final assessment to decide military intervention.<br>4. For rapid assessment needs, develop assessment team with Special Forces core. | 1. Documentation, education, equipment<br>2. Organization, docu-mentation, education, equipment<br>3. Organization, edu-cation, documenta-tion, equipment<br>4. Organization, edu-cation, documentation |
|  | Collect information on requirements already being met. | See situation assessment alternatives. | See situation assess-ment costs. |
| Develop mission statement. | Support, not sup-plant existing relief structure. | 1. Include relief community/host nation in operational planning team.<br>2. Interact extensively with DART and coun-try team.<br>3. Consult with relief community/host nation. | 1. Organization, edu-cation, doctrine<br>2. Education, doctrine, equipment<br>3. Education, equip-ment |
|  | Examine sustain-ability of accom-plishments. | 1. Plan with follow-on organization in OPT.<br>2. Communicate with follow-on organiza-tions during planning. | 1. Organization, edu-cation, doctrine<br>2. Education, equip-ment, doctrine |
|  | Ensure end-state consistency. | Have political advisor assigned to JTF OPT. | Organization, educa-tion |
|  | Develop MOEs. | Form a committee with military, relief, ana-lytic representation to address. | Organization |

Table 2.   Summary of planning requirements for HAOs (continued)

| Broad Require-ment | Requirements | Alternatives | Cost considerations |
|---|---|---|---|
| Identify mission require-ments. | Identify humanitar-ian requirements. | 1. Consult with relief community/host nation via OPT and use situation assess-ment.<br>2. Consult with relief community/host nation via communication devices and use situation assessment. | 1. Organization, edu-cation, see situation assessment costs<br>2. Education, equip-ment, see situation assessment |
| | Identify coalition requirements. | 1. Include coalition partners in OPT.<br>2. Consult with coalition partners. | 1. Organization, edu-cation<br>2. Education, equip-ment |
| | Identify relief orga-nization require-ments | 1. Include relief community in OPT.<br>2. Consult with relief organizations. | 1. Organization, edu-cation<br>2. Education, equip-ment |
| Determine capabilities to meet require-ments. | Identify and match coalition partner capabilities with requirements. | 1. Include coalition partners in OPT.<br>2. Consult with coalition partners. | 1. Organization, edu-cation<br>2. Education, equip-ment |
| | Identify U.S. mili-tary and govern-ment capabilities and match with requirements. | 1. Include military components and rele-vant U.S. Government agencies in OPT.<br>2. Consult with U.S. Government agencies during planning. | 1. Organization doc-trine, education<br>2. Education, equip-ment, doctrine |
| Develop informa-tion cam-paign plan using three pillars. | Pillar 1: Intelligence | See assessment information alternatives. | See assessment infor-mation costs. |
| | Pillar 2: PSYOP | 1. Improve access to Marine PSYOP reserves.<br>2. Improve access to Army PSYOP person-nel. | 1. Organization<br>2. Organization |
| | Pillar 3: Media | 1. Identify public affairs officer in warning order. | None |

Table 2. Summary of planning requirements for HAOs (continued)

| Broad Require- ment | Requirements | Alternatives | Cost considerations |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coordinate | Coordinate with relief organizations and/or host nation. | 1. Include relief organizations or host nation in OPT. 2. Use relief organizations or host nation as consultants to determine requirements. 3. Include relief community/host nation in the information fusion center. | 1. Organization, education 2. Education, equipment 3. Organization, education, equipment |
| | Coordinate with coalition partners. | 1. Include coalition partners in OPT. 2. Use coalition partners as consultants to determine requirements. 3. Establish high-level group to establish common goals. | 1. Organization, education 2. Education, equipment 3. Organization, education, equipment |
| | Coordinate with policy-makers. | 1. Establish high-level group to establish common goals. 2. Establish interagency coordination group to balance political and operational objectives. 3. Request a political advisor to the CJTF 4. Educate policy-makers. | 1. Organization, education, equipment 2. Organization, education 3. None 4. Education |

# Recommendations

The key areas of importance that need adjusting during planning for an HAO are information and coordination. In the short term, to improve the Marines' capabilities in the information area, we recommend that the intelligence community use nontraditional, as well as traditional, sources pre-crisis and during mission planning to assess the situation in potential crisis areas. We also recommend that the intelligence community expand the types of information it collects. For example, information on the culture of the people, the location of refugee or migrant populations, and the conditions of the infrastructure should be gathered. The associated education and documentation costs required to implement these changes are course work, an additional chapter in the U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence publication, or an additional intelligence publication for HAOs. It should not take time away from education that uses traditional sources of information in a warfighting mission; these sources should be used as well. Some NGOs/PVOs/IOs use the Internet to communicate the situation in crisis areas and this source can be tapped. Using the Internet may require additional equipment.

In the long term, the Marines, along with the rest of the U.S. military, should request that an organization be formed to gather and fuse information to develop a picture of the situation in potential crisis areas. This standing operational information organization would consist of the intelligence community, the State Department, and others. The military could begin "pre-crisis" (vice contingency) planning for the top few crisis areas based on this information. It could also be used during crisis action planning for military intervention.

To address coordination for planning at the operations level, we recommend that the Marines consult with or include the relief community in mission planning. These representatives should understand what the relief community/host nation can sustain, as well as the areas where they need help to diffuse the crisis situation. In addition,

the JTF and CINC OPTs should consult with the DART. The cost associated with this recommendation is to educate the CJTF staffs to negotiate, and use the nontraditional information provided by the information community (culture of host nation and relief organizations) to facilitate this coordination.

# Appendix A: Planning Requirements Matrix

This appendix provides an outline of the planning requirements derived from examination of reports, JULLs, MCLLs, articles, doctrine, and so forth from HAOs, HAO exercises, and conferences.

| Assessment | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Situation | | | |
| | | Develop fused picture of the situation | | |
| | | | Culture | |
| | | | Lines of communication | |
| | | | Infrastructure | |
| | | | Health | |
| | | | Security | |
| | | | Food | |
| | | | Sanitation | |
| | | | Economy | |
| | | | Agricultural | |
| | Requirements being met | | | |
| | | Sources of capabilities | | |
| | | | NGOs/PVOs/IOs | |
| | | | Host nation | |
| | | | Foreign militaries | |
| | | | UN | |
| Mission Statement | | | | |
| | Support, not supplant | | | |
| | | Understand relief structure already in place | | |
| | | | ID gaps in relief structure | |
| | | | Multiply the effect of the relief effort | |
| | | Focus on military-unique requirements | | |
| | Plan requirements so follow-on organization can sustain military functions | | | |
| | | Plan for building bridges to rehab phase | | |
| | | Long-term success | | |
| | Establish end state | | | |
| | | Work with follow-on organization to establish end state | | |
| | | Ensure end state is in line with political objectives | | |
| | | Develop meaningful MOEs to track progress towards end state | | |
| | | | Humanitarian MOEs | |
| | | | Transition measures | |
| | | | Task MOEs | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Identify requirements that current relief org/host nation cannot address | | | | |
| | Understand types of humanitarian crises | | | |
| | Areas of focus | | | |
| | | Logistic | | |
| | | Engineering | | |
| | | Transportation | | |
| | | Food | | |
| | | Security | | |
| | | Civil affairs | | |
| | | Medical | | |
| | | | Supplies | |
| | | | Doctors | |
| | | Legal | | |
| | | Coalition | | |
| | | NGOs/PVOs/IOs | | |
| | | Host nation | | |
| | | Media | | |
| | | PSYOP | | |
| | Sources to help prioritize humanitarian requirements | | | |
| | | Assessment | | |
| | | NGOs/PVOs/IOs | | |
| | | Host nation | | |
| Match capabilities with requirements | | | | |
| | Consult with other sources of capabilities (see assessment) | | | |
| | Military sources of capabilities | | | |
| | | US military | | |
| | | Coalition partners | | |
| | Considerations for matching | | | |
| | | Timeliness | | |
| | | Politics | | |
| | | Relationship with the host nation | | |
| | | Command relationships | | |

| Develop information strategy/campaign plan | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Develop image to convey to support mission objectives | | | |
| | Integrate gathering, analysis, dissemination assets | | | |
| | Use three pillars to convey message | | | |
| | | Intelligence/information | | |
| | | | Coordinate assessments | |
| | | | Disseminate picture | |
| | | PSYOP | | |
| | | | Develop a clear theme | |
| | | | Identify target audience | |
| | | | Identify appropriate means of communicating | |
| | | | Communicate military intentions | |
| | | Media(s) | | |
| | | | Develop clear message | |
| | | | Coordinate message with | |
| | | | | Intelligence |
| | | | | PSYOP |
| | | | | Public affairs |
| | | | | Coalition elements |
| | | | | NGO/PVO/IO |
| | | | Identify PAO officer in warning order | |

| Coordination | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | NGOs/PVOs/IOs and/or host nation | | | |
| | | Source of information | | |
| | | Facilitate transition planning a | | |
| | | | Integrate into operations | |
| | | | Identify capabilities | |
| | | Establish humanitarian priorities | | |
| | | | Identify requirements to support NGOs/PVOs/IOs | |
| | | Convey military capabilities | | |
| | Coalition partners | | | |
| | | Identify capabilities | | |
| | | Identify requirements to support | | |
| | | Provide education to US (for those partners with HAO experience) | | |
| | | Establish common goals | | |
| | | Understand timeline for deployment | | |
| | | Examine interoperability issues | | |
| | | Understand SOFAs | | |
| | Policy-makers | | | |
| | | Understand political objectives | | |
| | | | Establish role of military forces | |
| | | | Establish a common end state | |
| | | Educate policy makers to balance political and operational requirements | | |
| | | | Form coalition | |
| | | | Convey timelines | |

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